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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The Court concluded that in such a district a garage
properly built to, under, or around an apartment house is
not a nuisance per se but its use may, from the facts of
operation, become a nuisance. It was also decided that
where two apartments in the same vicinity are joined in
the same ownership, a garage under one building may
serve both, the Court leaving the matter of the use of the
garage by other owners in the immediate vicinity to the
discretion of the court below. The rule as to public garages
remains in full vigor in those districts outside apartment
house influence.
The public garage is a nuisance in residence districts,
Class A and Class B. In Class C, in portions unaffected by
apartment houses, the 'rule is the same. In a Class C
district bordering on a commercial district or affected by
apartment houses the rule now is that a public garage
may be a nuisance in fact but not per se.
The change in policy evidenced by these cases is a
happy one. It might have been wiser to have denied the
operation of the rule in any Class C district. The cases
seem to foreshadow such a rule in the near future if not
a complete abdication of the doctrine.
The latter portion of the Ladner case seems unfor-
tunate. The public garage rule was said to depend not at
all on the ownership of the cars or the building but on
the injurious effect on adjoining owners. Why then is
the Court so careful to limit the discretion of the lower
court to the use of the garage by owners in the immediate
vicinity? If the effect when used by tenants of the sur-
rounding apartment or nearby apartments or by owners
in the immediate vicinity is not injurious to adjoining
owners, how can it be injurious if used by owners who
do not live in the immediate vicinity? Manner of opera-
tion is to be the test regardless of the domicil of the users,
be it near or far. This the Court seems to have forgotten.
Harold S. Irwin
CONSTITUTIONALITY BY LONG ACQUIESCENCE
AND TACIT ASSUMPTION-An interesting field of spec-
ulation is opened to the -inquiring mind by the reasoning
of the courts on the weight to be given to a contempor-
aneous or practical construction of the constitution by an
agency other than the court which has charged itself with
final jurisdiction of constitutional questions. It frequently
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occurs that the court is confronted with the necessity of
deciding the constitutionality of a question on which other
officers in the discharge of their official duties have acted
for a long period of time and rights have accrued under
their construction. Great weight is given to their construc-
tion, though not to the extent of absolute control. The
courts justify such action not only upon the relatively fa-
miliar ground of the inconvenience which would be caused
to the rights thus vested, but also upon the theory that it
his been approved by acquiescence, or, to be exact, by the
absence of effective objection.
Treading at first with the caution appropriate to un-
certain ground, and faced with intelligent criticism, the
courts, gradually gathered courage from the lack of effect-
ive objection which was the very basis of their argument
and came to place more unquestioning reliance upon this
theory as each year added its fortifying assurance to the
doctrine.
The earlier cases, lacking the support of years of ac-
quiescence, reasoned from the basis of contemporaneous
construction. Thus we find Mr. Justice Story using the
following language:' "Strong as this conclusion stands upon
the general language of the Constitution, it may still derive
support from other sources. * * * * It is an historical fact
that the Supreme Court of the United States have from
time to time sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great
variety of cases, brought from the tribunals of many of the
most important States of the Union, and that no State
tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject,
or declined to obey the mandate of the Supreme Court,
until the present occasion. This weight of contempor-
aneous exposition by all parties, this acquiescence by en-
lightened State courts, and these judicial decisions of the
Supreme Court through so long a period, do, as we think,
place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which
cannot be shaken without delivering over the subject to
perpetual and irremediable doubts."
In a later case,2 Mr. Justice Johnson says: "Every
candid mind will admit that this is a very different thing
from contending that the frequent repetition of a wrong
will create a right. It proceeds upon the presumption that
the contemporaries of the Constitution have claims to our
deference on the question of right, because they had the
best opportunities of informing themselves of the under-
' Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304.
-Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 290.
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standing of the framers of the Constitution, and of the
sense put upon it by the people when it was adopted by
them."
In a case decided in 18033 the Supreme Court used even
stronger expressions in justifying a practice of their own
instituting: "It is sufficient to observe that practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years, com-
mencing with the organization of the judicial system,
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the con-
struction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most
forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and
obstinate to be shaken or controlled." (Note that the
"practical exposition" and "contemporaneous construction"
are those of the court pronouncing the judgment. Does
the word "obstinate" carry the implication of a threat?)
In more recent cases, there appears to be a tendency
to rely upon the principle of long acquiescence without the
trouble of supporting it by argument. Thus we find the
court in the case of Leser v. Garnett,4 decided in 1922, reason-
ing that the Nineteenth Amendment does not violate the
fundamental principles of the Constitution because it is
similar in character to the Fifteenth which has been acted
upon without effective objection for half a century. In the
cases cited the Fifteenth Amendment was applied, but its
validity was not directly questioned.
In the State Courts the doctrine has been frequently
employed but with the usual difference of opinion, and re-
sulting diversity of application. With less caution about
definitely committing themselves to a fixed policy than the
Supreme Court uses, it might be expected that the ex-
tremes of the doctrine would here be found. This may be
illustrated by cases from a few jurisdictions.
In an early Massachusetts case 5 the court says: "Al-
though if it were now res integra, it might be very difficult
to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argu-
ment ab inconvenienti applies with great weight. We can-
not shake a principle which in practice has so long and
extensively prevailed. If the practice originated in error,
yet the error is now so common that it must have the
force. of law. The legal ground upon which this provision
is now supported is, that long and continued usage furnishes
a contemporaneous construction which must prevail over
the mere technical import of the words."
3Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299.
4258 U. S. 130.
5Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475.
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In an Ohio case6 the court reluctantly approves the
legislative practice of granting divorces, though holding it
a usurpation of power, solely on the ground of long ac-
quiescence, saying: "Our legislature have assumed and ex-
ercised this power for a period of more than forty years,
although a clear and palpable assumption of power, and an
encroachment upon the judicial department, in violation
of the Constitution. To deny this long exercised power,
and declare all the consequences resulting from it void, is
pregnant with fearful consequences."
In a case from Illinois,71 where the legislature had been
granting railroad charters by special law, the court said:
"It is now too late to make this objection, since, by action
of the General Assembly under this clause, special acts
have been so long the order of the day and the ruling pas-
sion with every legislature which has convened under the
Constitution * * * and important and valuable rights are
claimed under them. * * * But the Legislature, in their
wisdom, have thought differently, and have acted differ-
ently until now our Special Legislation and its mischiefs,
are beyond recovery or remedy."
In sharp contrast to these cases where the incon-
venience of the result was allowed to silence the mandates
of the Constitution, are a few cases which disregard it. The
Supreme Court of Indiana believes that in construing con-
stitutions, courts have nothing to do with the argument
ab inconvenienti and should not "bend the Constitution to
suit the law of the hour."
The same principle is elaborated by Bronson, Chief
Justice in a New York case9 in the following language: "It
is highly probable that inconvenience will result from fol-
lowing the Constitution as it is.written, but that considera-
tion can have no force with me. It is not for us, but for
those who made the Constitution to supply its defects. * * *
My rule has ever been to follow the fundamental law as it
is written, regardless of consequences. If the law does not
work well, the people can amend it; and inconveniences
can be borne long enough to await that process."
Under close scrutiny the doctrine of Constitutionality
by long acquiescence bears a startling family resemblance
to that trite and misleading aphorism "Silence gives as-
sent", but borrows no savor from such relationship. Nor
6Brigham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 446.
TJohnson v. Joliet & Chicago R. R. Co., 23 IlL 202.
8Greencastle Twp. v. Black, 5 Ind. 557.
9Oakley v, Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547,
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is it easy to see how it can gain strength from such weak
supports as "Communis error tacit jus." The party penalized
by this imputed laches is the body politic, the people in
their capacity as constitution makers. They, as such, have
no independence of action, but can proceed only through
the legal sovereignty, their duly constituted and sole
agents, and, mirabile dictu, the very agency which pro-
nounces the limitation against them.
The force of such an argument can be more readily
seen when attended by circumstances such as those which
caused Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, of Pennsylvania, to
change his views on the power of Courts to declare legisla-
tion unconstitutional and void. In 1825 this astute logician
argued with great force against the existence of such power
in a dissenting opinion.1" In 1845 this opinion was men-
tioned by counsel in the argument of Norris v. Clymer, 2
Pa. 277, to which he replied: "I have changed that opinion
for two reasons. The late convention (1838) by their
silence, sanctioned the pretensions of the courts to deal
freely with the acts of the Legislature; and from experi-
ence of the necessity of the case." But how, when no con-
stitutional revision has intervened, can assent of the people,
so vital in Constitutional matters, be imputed to them from
this so-called "acquiescence?"
The resentment of vested interests which are "incon-
venienced" by strict adherence to the Constitution is ap-
parently more to be reckoned with than the wrongs of a
Constitution which can only suffer in silence when outraged
by its protectors.
J. F. Ingham
THE TIME FOR FILING AFFIDAVITS OF DE-
FENSE IN ACTIONS OF TRESPASS-In a number of
lower Court cases a question has been raised as to the right
of the defendant in actions of trespass to file an affdavit
of defense after the expiration of fifteen days from the
service of the statement upon him. This same question
has been raised in actions of assumpsit and the Supreme
Court has decided that an affidavit of defense in actions
of assumpsit may be filed at anytime before judgment for
want of an affidavit of defense has been entered. Fuel City
Mfg. Company v. Waynesburg P. C., 268 Pa. 441-446. The
10Fakip v. Raub, 12 S. & R. 330.
